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This paper reviews the current knowledge on an issue of increasing policy interest: what impact
fiscal decentralization has on economic growth.  Fiscal decentralization may indeed have a direct
impact on economic growth but the theoretical underpinnings for this relationship remain largely
undeveloped.  The absence of an adequate theoretical framework has undermined the validity of
the empirical work on this subject.  A fair summary of the empirical search for a direct
relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth is that it remains an open
question.  Much less attention has been devoted in the literature to the indirect channels through
which fiscal decentralization may affect economic growth, through the impact of fiscal
decentralization on economic efficiency, the regional distribution of resources, and
macroeconomic stability.  This paper explorers the nature of these links and concludes with
some thoughts and policy advice.
JEL Classification Numbers: E62, H77
Keywords: Fiscal Decentralization, Economic Growth
2  It is not our intention to review here the now vast and still fast growing literature on fiscal decentralization. For reviews
of the literature see Rondinelli and Nellis (1986), Rubinfeld (1987), Oates (1990, 1991), Prud’homme (1991), Shah
(1994), Bird and Vaillancourt (1997), and Ter-Minasian (1997).
3  See, for example, Dillinger (1994).
4  See World Bank (1999).
5  See, for example, Oates (1972), Bahl and Linn (1992), Guess, Loehr, and Martinez-Vazquez (1997), Spahn (1997),
Burki, Perry, and Dillinger (1999), and Shah (1999).
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1. Introduction
This paper reviews the current knowledge in the economics literature on the causal
relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth, whether this relationship is
uni-directional or bi-directional, and to what extent synergies appear to exist between fiscal
decentralization, on the one hand, and economic growth, on the other.2  Over the past decade
most developing and transitional countries have either embarked upon or stated their intention to
embark upon some type of fiscal decentralization initiative.3  Often, one of the stated primary
policy objectives of fiscal decentralization is to foster economic growth.  The interest in fiscal
decentralization as an engine for economic growth is not limited to developing and transitional
economies, but has also emerged to the forefront of the policy agendas of most OECD
countries.4  These broad-based policy agendas call for a closer examination of the potential
relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth.
The increased interest in fiscal decentralization has several roots.  First, the renewed
focus on fiscal decentralization appears to be fueled by the widespread belief that fiscal
decentralization is an effective tool for increasing the efficiency of public expenditures, even
though it may carry some risks vis-a-vis other desirable objectives for government policy, such
as horizontal fiscal imbalances across subnational governments and macro-economic stability.5
6  Brennan and Buchanan (1980) is the classical exposition of how fiscal decentralization can control the Leviathan.  See
Ehdaie (1994) for empirical evidence that decentralization may reduce the size of the public sector.
7  For example, actual deconcentration efforts in the guise of decentralization is a common process in countries in
transition such as the Central Asia republics (Martinez-Vazquez, McLure, and Wallace 1999), Ukraine (Martinez-
Vazquez, McLure, and Wallace 1995) or even Vietnam (McLure and Martinez-Vazquez, 1997).
8 See Bird (1993), Bird and Vaillancourt (1997), and Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (1998) for a discussion of the
difference between delegation, devolution, and deconcentration of fiscal authority.
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Second, the rush to decentralize can also be seen as a reaction to the failures over the past two
decades of large centralized bureaucracies under very different political regimes in developing
and transitional countries.  Decentralization is also seen as a way to break the central
government’s grip on the economy by shifting fiscal authority to subnational governments.6  As
Taillant (1994) has put it, the issue in many of these countries has become not “whether to” but
“how best to” decentralize.
However, decentralization may actually appear to be more popular among developing
and transitional countries than it truly is because there is often a confusion in terminology.  What
some transitional and developing governments call fiscal decentralization is actually nothing
more than the geographical deconcentration of central government bureaucracy and service
delivery.7  Deconcentration can be described as a process geared to increasing the effectiveness
and flexibility of the provision of government services by providing previously centralized
services through regional and local offices but, other than geographic similarities,
deconcentration has little to do with fiscal decentralization.  Although there are several ways to
describe the process of fiscal decentralization, its essence is captured by the two related
processes of either “delegation” or “devolution” of fiscal authority.  In either case, decision
making power on the composition of expenditures and often on the composition and level of
revenues is shifted to separately elected subnational governments.8 
9  Several recent studies examine the relationship between fiscal decentralization and other policy objectives.  These
include: Grote and von Braun (2000), who investigate whether decentralization reduces poverty; Treisman (2000) who
examines the relationship between decentralization and the quality of government; and de Melo (2000) who studies the
relationship between fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental fiscal relations.
10  The list of recent empirical investigations focusing on the direct relationship between fiscal decentralization and
economic growth includes:  Zhang and Zou (1997, 1998), Davoodi and Zou (1998), Woller and Phillips (1998), and Lin
and Liu (2000).
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While there has been a myriad of policy discussions on the application and influence of
fiscal decentralization, in contrast, there has been limited empirical work quantifying the effects
of fiscal decentralization.  The lack of empirical research is surprising given that economic
efficiency is the central argument for fiscal decentralization and that the potential negative
impacts of fiscal decentralization on the distribution of resources across subnational jurisdictions
and macroeconomic stability are the central arguments against fiscal decentralization.9
Curiously, most of the recent empirical work has focused more on the direct impact of fiscal
decentralization on economic growth, which has not been among the more conventionally
addressed effects of decentralization.10  The focus on the direct impact of fiscal decentralization
on economic growth is also surprising because there has been little effort to define the theoretical
links between the immediate effects of decentralization (economic efficiency, disparity in the
distribution of public resources among subnational governments, and macroeconomic stability)
and economic growth.  The failure of the empirical work thus far to provide a conclusive answer
to what the overall impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth is may be due in part to
the lack of understanding of how fiscal decentralization relates directly and, more importantly,
indirectly to economic growth.
The unfinished agenda in the theory and practice of fiscal decentralization is to
understand how fiscal decentralization affects the traditional economic objectives of economic
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efficiency, horizontal fiscal equality, and macroeconomic stability; and how these may, in turn,
affect economic growth.  Understanding these linkages, and quantifying any potential tradeoffs
associated with them, should help produce more informed policies for fiscal decentralization in
developing and transitional economies.  As we discuss in this paper, the debate over fiscal
decentralization in developing and transitional economies has, for the most part, focused on
intuition, case studies, and evidence from individual country studies of developed economies.
While these approaches are not wrong and, in many ways, have been invaluable to understanding
the role played by each country’s history and institutions, panel-based (cross-country, time-
series) studies can also provide important insights on the likely economic effects of fiscal
decentralization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we review the traditional lack of
attention to economic growth in the fiscal decentralization literature. Second, we present the
empirical findings to date regarding the potential relationship between fiscal decentralization and
economic growth. Third, we discuss the possible theoretical linkages between fiscal
decentralization and growth and outline an empirical methodology for testing these potential
linkages.  The last subsection sums up and reviews the policy implications from our current
knowledge of the issues.  
2. Economic growth has not been a traditional concern in the theory of fiscal
decentralization.
Traditionally, the theory and practice of fiscal decentralization has given little attention to
the objective of economic growth. Only quite recently have normative discussions of fiscal
decentralization added economic growth to the traditional list of public finance objectives of
11 See, for example, Bird and Vaillancourt (1997). The lack of preoccupation with economic growth in the fiscal
decentralization  literature is evidenced by the fact that there is no discussion of this objective in textbooks on the subject;
for example, Fisher (1993).
12  See, for example, Oates (1972) and Boadway and Wildasin (1984).
13  Using Hirshman’s terminology, Oates (1993) describes the two systems for conveying preferences for public goods
to local government officials through “voice” (voting elections and responsiveness to the local electorate) and “exit”
(fiscal mobility or taxpayers voting with their feet by moving across jurisdictions).
14  A number of researchers have questioned whether developing and transitional countries have the preference revelation
mechanisms (voting and geographical mobility) or the institutional capacity to realize the full gains resulting from fiscal
decentralization.  See Bahl and Nath (1986), Conyers (1990), Prud’homme (1991, 1995), Tanzi (1996, 2000), Litvack,
Ahmad, and Bird (1998), and Dethier (1999, 2000).
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efficiency in the allocation of resources, horizontal fiscal imbalances, and economic
stabilization.11
Instead the traditional argument for fiscal decentralization is that it may provide greater
economic efficiency in the allocation of resources in the public sector.12  Under the assumption
that public officials respond to the desires of their constituents, subnational governments are
better able to match differing preferences across jurisdictions. Gains in efficiency are enhanced
if taxpayers are mobile because they can migrate or sort themselves out among the jurisdictions
that best match their preferred tax-expenditure package, as first discussed by Tiebout (1956).13
In short, if preferences for public goods differ across regions or individuals, the level of welfare
achieved through a uniform provision of public goods by a central government is inferior to that
which can be attained by a decentralized provision which allows for differences across
jurisdictions.14
Efficiency is one of the three objectives, the other two being income redistribution and
macroeconomic stability, initially stated by Musgrave (1959) and widely accepted as guides to
government policy.  But if decentralized governments can play an important role in efficiency,
there is some agreement that the objectives of income redistribution and macroeconomic
15  See, for example, Prud’homme (1995) and Tanzi (1996, 2000).  But see McLure (1995), Sewell (1996), Spahn (1997),
and Shah (1999) for a dissenting point of view.
16   However, in practice, subnational governments do engage in redistribution policies.  See, for example, Bahl,
Martinez-Vazquez and Wallace (1996). 
17  Macroeconomic stability in decentralized systems may be more easily attained if shocks to the economy are not
symmetrically distributed (Gramlich 1993 and Spahn 1997) or if decentralization results in a more transparent
assignment of responsibilities across levels of government (Shah 1999).
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stability may be better pursued by the central or federal governments.15  Even though subnational
governments may differ in their preferences for income redistribution, the mobility of
households and businesses will tend to make differences in redistributional policies self-
defeating because the rich would move out of and the poor would move into the jurisdiction.16
Attempts to implement macroeconomic stabilization by subnational governments are also
believed to be ineffective because of the considerable economic “leakages” associated with local
expenditures.17
Overall, the lack of direct concern with the objective of economic growth in the theory
and practice of fiscal decentralization has its roots in the lack of attention given to this objective
in public sector economics.  However, public sector economics has paid indirect attention to the
objective of economic growth by focusing on issues such as how taxation may distort economic
incentives toward savings and investment, how to evaluate the relative worthiness of public
investment projects (as for example in the theory of cost-benefit analysis), or how to improve the
performance of private markets through spending on education and health systems or
investments in basic infrastructure.  The general implicit assumption in public sector economics
has been that economic growth is fueled by the growth in the quantity and quality of economic
inputs (labor, capital, and natural resources) and by technological change in the private sector.
The role of the public sector is to facilitate, or not to impede, this process.
18 See Oates (1972), Pommerehne (1977), Kee (1977), Bahl and Nath (1986), Wasylenko (1987), and Panizza (1998).
This type of study has been criticized for performing inter-country comparisons using aggregate measures of fiscal
decentralization, such as the share of subnational government in overall expenditure or revenues of the general
government (Bird 1986).
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3. What do we know about the effect of decentralization on economic growth?
A significant feature of the current state of the fiscal decentralization literature is the
paucity of empirical information regarding the effects of decentralization, not only on economic
growth, but also on the traditional objectives of economic efficiency, income redistribution, and
macroeconomic stability.  As we discuss below, the analysis of the direct role of the public
sector in economic growth is a relatively new area of study, with the contribution of fiscal
decentralization to economic growth only emerging in the last decade.  In the following
paragraphs we discuss the existing empirical evidence on the potential relationship between
fiscal decentralization and growth.
From economic growth to fiscal decentralization:  Even though there has been little
research on the causation line from decentralization to growth, interestingly, there has been
extensive empirical analysis of the reverse question: to what extent is the level of
decentralization a function of the level of economic development?  It is well documented that
most measures of fiscal decentralization across countries, such as share of expenditures or
revenues of subnational governments in the general government budget, are positively correlated
with the level of economic development, generally measured by per capita income.18  There is
less agreement in the literature about how to interpret the fact that decentralization is a more
common and deeper phenomenon in industrialized countries.  One possible explanation is that
decentralization is like a superior good.  It is only at relatively high levels of per capita income
that decentralization is demanded or becomes “attractive” to taxpayers in the sense that its
benefits can be more fully exploited without the problems or disadvantages that tend to be more
19  Conyers’ (1990) conjecture would suggest that, other things equal, the level of decentralization across developing
countries should vary directly with the time period they have been independent and with some proxy of how centralized
the colonial administration systems were.  These control variables have not been introduced so far in the empirical
literature.
20  The ups and downs of the extent of decentralization in the United States (Wallis and Oates, 1988 and Shannon, 1997)
are clear witnesses that no such monotonic relationship does exist.
21  Other variables that have been found to be positively related to the level of decentralization across countries include:
population size (Oates, 1972; Pommerehne, 1977; Bahl and Nath, 1986); a federalist constitution (Oates, 1972; Kee,
1977; Bahl and Nath, 1986; and Wasylenko, 1987); more urbanized population (Kee, 1977 and Bahl and Nath, 1986);
less open economies (Kee, 1977 and Wasylenko, 1987); more equal distribution of income (Pommerehne, 1977); greater
geographical sectionalism (Oates, 1972), and greater ethnic fractionalization (Panizza, 1998).
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present in countries at lower levels of development (Bahl and Linn, 1992).  This correlation
between economic development and the depth of decentralization may also be due to the fact
that many developing countries inherited highly centralized systems at the time of their
independence from their colonial powers.19  However, there appears to be wide agreement with
Oates’ (1993) assessment that the empirical correlation between the level of development and
the presence of fiscal decentralization should not be interpreted to say that there is a monotonic
relationship between the two such that decentralization intensifies without bound with per capita
income,20 or that a decentralized system of public finances will not offer advantages to countries
at lower levels of economic development.21
From fiscal decentralization to economic growth: While several recent studies have
attempted to quantify the role of government expenditures on economic growth, the question of
what impact decentralized government expenditures have on economic growth remains largely
unaddressed.  Aschauer (1989) and Barro (1990) find that an increasing share of central
government consumption in GDP is negatively associated with growth in per capita income.  In
an earlier study, Ram (1986) found a positive relationship between central government
consumption in GDP and growth in per capita income.  Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou (1996)
examine the impact of the composition of public expenditures on economic growth and find that
while an increase in the share of current central government expenditure has a positive and
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statistically significant effect on growth, the capital component of public expenditure has a
negative impact on per capita growth. They conjecture that developing country governments
may have been allocating too many resources to capital investments at the cost of more
productive current expenditures.  On the other hand, other researchers have found that public
infrastructure spending has a positive significant impact on growth (Aschauer, 1989 and Easterly
and Rebelo, 1993).  There is also some evidence that the efficiency of public expenditures can
differ considerably across countries.  Gupta, Honjo, and Verhoeven (1997) assess the efficiency
of government expenditures on education and health in 38 countries in Africa and find that, on
average, countries in Africa are less efficient than countries in Asia and the Western
Hemisphere.  They do suggest that the observed inefficiencies may be a result of relatively high
government wages and the intra-sectoral allocation of government resources.
None of the studies above is concerned with the potential impact of the degree of
decentralization (or intergovernmental composition of public expenditure or revenue
assignment) on economic growth. An emerging line of research has attempted to test the
presence of a direct link between fiscal decentralization and economic growth with mixed
results. Zhang and Zou (1997) find that different measures of fiscal decentralization seem to
have a positive and sometimes significant effect on regional economic growth in India.  Lin and
Liu (2000) conclude that fiscal decentralization positively and significantly influences economic
growth in China.  This contrasts with the opposite general finding that fiscal decentralization is
associated with slower growth for the case of China by Zhang and Zou (1998), for the United
States by Davoodi, Xie, and Zou (1995), and for a full sample of both developing and developed
countries by Davoodi and Zou (1998).  However, Woller and Phillips (1998) fail to find a
22  These studies use different levels of disaggregation of expenditures and revenues at different levels of government.
For example, Davoodi, Xie and Zou (1995), Davoodi and Zou (1998), and Woller and Phillips (1998) concentrate on
the role of aggregate spending of different levels of government while Zhang and Zou (1997, 1998) carry this analysis
further by looking at the impact of the sectoral composition of public expenditures at different levels of government on
economic growth. Lin and Liu (2000) use the marginal revenue retention rate as a measure of fiscal decentralization.
-10-
statistically significant and robust relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic
growth for a panel of developing countries.22 
Although the theoretical underpinnings of this literature still need to be further
developed, as discussed below, these studies have not only provided the first empirical estimates
of the potential effect of decentralization on economic growth but have also provided insights
into different aspects of this relationship. For example, if fiscal decentralization could be
measured, as is done in this literature, in a single dimension (for example the share of
expenditures or revenues of subnational governments in the general government) then we should
not expect a monotonic relationship between decentralization and growth (Davoodi and Zou,
1998). That is, it is not necessarily true that the more decentralized a country’s fiscal system
becomes, the faster its economy will grow, but rather, we should expect that there exists an
optimal degree of fiscal decentralization which is less than full decentralization (subnational
governments’ share of expenditures (revenues) is 100 percent).  Of course, the bounds are
imposed by the fact that there are some public goods, those with nation-wide benefits, that can
be more efficiently provided at the national level.  However, within the context of more
complex, multi-dimensional definitions of decentralization (for example, an index encompassing
tax autonomy and budgetary discretion), it may be possible to obtain multiple optima, and even a
monotonic relationship between decentralization and economic growth. The recent literature on
the empirical relationship between decentralization and growth also raises several estimation
issues for future work, which we address next.
23  Recently, Lin and Liu (2000) follow Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) and specify a  Solow (1956) model of
economic growth that assumes decreasing returns to all forms of reproducible capital.
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Empirical issues in the estimation of a relationship: Several estimation issues will need
to be addressed in the future to strengthen our confidence in the empirical results on the role of
fiscal decentralization in economic growth.  First, there is the issue of possible misspecification
of the empirical estimation models.  The literature on economic growth suggests that long-term
growth may be a function of many variables such as economic freedom and basic legal structure,
savings rates, investment behavior, and general capital accumulation, human capital,
technological development and change, and so on.  Excluding some of the necessary control
variables across countries or over time may result in omitted variable bias leading to the false
conclusion that a statistically significant relationship exists between growth and fiscal
decentralization.  In short, there is a need to verify that the estimated relationships between
decentralization and growth are robust under alternative specifications of the estimation model.
Levine and Renelt (1992) note the general lack of robustness in the empirical growth literature
that has tried to identify the impact of diverse government policies on growth.  Using cross-
country time series data, they conclude that the significant correlation between measures of
economic policy and economic growth found in many previous studies are fragile.  In particular,
they find that the statistical significance for those economic policy variables is lost by the
inclusion of other explanatory variables in the estimation equation.  This is the fate of a wide
array of fiscal-expenditure variables, monetary policy indicators, and political stability indices.
The only robust correlations they find are for the share of investment in GDP and for the share of
international trade in GDP and economic growth. To date, the majority of the studies directly
linking fiscal decentralization and economic growth employ Barro’s (1990) endogenous growth
model, where the production function for the economy has multiple inputs including private
capital and multiple public spending by the three levels of government.23  While Davoodi and
24  Feder (1992) and McNab and Moore (1998) show that increases in exports are significantly and robustly associated
with economic growth. This may be an important omission especially for developing and transitional countries, where
external trade plays a critical role.
25  See Guess, Loehr, and Martinez-Vazquez (1997).
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Zou (1998) use the Levine-Renelt conditioning variables (investment, population growth, human
capital) to test the fragility of the estimate for fiscal decentralization, they do not control for the
impact of the external sector.24  Many of the other studies of the relationship between fiscal
decentralization and economic growth also fail to properly condition their estimates.
Second, the measurement of fiscal decentralization used by the majority of empirical
studies as an explanatory variable is, at least, problematic.  The issue is that there is no single or
best measure of decentralization.  The empirical literature has evolved significantly in the
precision with which the explanatory variable for fiscal decentralization is measured.  Initially
public expenditures were disaggregated into recurrent or consumption and capital expenditures,
later into different levels of government, and finally into types of expenditures by sector at
different levels of government. However, all these measures of fiscal decentralization are
defined on the basis of a single dimension of decentralization, expenditures going through the
subnational budgets or revenues raised by subnational governments.  We are sure to
misrepresent decentralization when we use a single dimension, no matter how detailed or
disaggregated.  Clearly, fiscal decentralization is multidimensional.  There are many aspects of a
country’s fiscal affairs that can be more or less decentralized.25  Even if one country has a greater
share for subnational governments in general expenditures or tax revenues, it can be the case that
a second country may be more decentralized overall because its subnational governments have
more significant autonomous sources of revenue or discretion over tax rates, or greater freedom
in how to make expenditure decisions on education, health or other services provided at the
subnational level. Even worse, a country may have a high share of general government
26  See, for example, Bird (1986).
27  Mauro (1995, 1996) conjectures that more fractionalization may lead to more corruption because bureaucrats may
favor members of their same group.  Shleifer and Vishny (1993) also suggest that more heterogeneous societies may be
subject to more corruption than homogeneous societies.
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expenditures going through subnational budgets, but de facto the level of decentralization may
be small because regional and/or local officials are not democratically elected and are only
accountable to central government authorities.  It would be desirable in future empirical research
to attempt to capture the multidimensionality of fiscal decentralization in estimating the impact
of fiscal decentralization on economic growth.  A possible point of departure could come from
quantifying the minimum conditions for effective fiscal decentralization such as discretion in the
margin to raise own revenues or the use of democratic elections, as suggested in the literature.26 
Third, given that our understanding of how decentralization may affect growth is not well
developed, there is a danger of accepting too willingly the product of spurious correlations.
This is a difficult problem to control, but a serious one given that decentralization and growth are
broad concepts which themselves are correlated with many other variables.  Consider the
following: Mauro (1995, 1996) finds that corruption lowers investment, thereby lowering
economic growth.  But Mauro also finds that corruption is highly correlated with ethnolinguistic
fractionalization (which measures the probability that two persons drawn at random in the
country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group).27  In general, we should expect
decentralization to be highly correlated with ethnolinguistic fractionalization because the
tensions associated with diversity in population are often addressed through more
decentralization.  In these circumstances it would not be the case that decentralization slows
growth, but that there may be more corruption with fractionalization and, therefore, less growth.
The problem of spurious correlation can only be controlled with better data and careful
specification of the estimating equations.
28  See, for example, Oates (1993), Bird (1993), Prud’homme (1995), and Peterson (1996).
29  Of course, the direct linkage between decentralization and growth can be derailed if fiscal decentralization does not
function effectively. The same is true for the greater efficiency of decentralization in a static sense. Oates (1993) and
others have questioned whether or not voting mechanisms, mobility, or competition, for example, function well enough
in developing and transitional economies to allow the realization of efficiency gains associated with decentralization.
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4. Theoretical linkages between fiscal decentralization and economic growth: What
should we be testing?
The review of the empirical literature shows clearly that we may be far from
understanding and therefore properly testing the relationship between decentralization and
economic growth. The empirical work on the potential impact of fiscal decentralization on
economic growth has offered thus far little detailed discussion of why we should expect this
relationship to exist.  Answering this basic question should allow us to construct better and more
discerning empirical tests.  The lack of a theoretical framework has also hampered the statistical
work. There is also wide agreement on the desirability of developing such a theoretical
framework.28  In this section we examine in some detail the avenues through which fiscal
decentralization may affect economic growth. This may provide the basis for the development of
a theoretical framework in the future.
Is there a direct linkage?  The first question is whether we can expect a direct linkage to
exist between decentralization and growth. Oates (1993) argues that, intuitively, the static
proposition that fiscal decentralization enhances economic efficiency should have a parallel in
the dynamic setting of economic growth.  Thus, expenditures for infrastructure and the social
sector that respond to regional or local differences are likely to be more effective in enhancing
economic development than central policies which may ignore those differences.29  However,
Oates is not very explicit about what this means.  The basic question is why, for example, $1
million spent on roads or education at the subnational level should be more growth-enhancing
than the same amount of money spent at the national level. The direct effect, pointed out by
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Oates, indicates that if subnational governments have an advantage in making public
expenditures more efficient (by better satisfying the needs and preferences of local taxpayers
based on better knowledge of these preferences), then this “static” advantage can also be present
in a “dynamic” sense by having subnational government expenditures be more growth
enhancing. On closer look, this argument would seem to need further development.
Indirect linkages between fiscal decentralization and economic growth:  Even if there is
no direct linkage between fiscal decentralization and growth derived from Oates’ (1993)
argument, there would appear to be several potential indirect linkages between fiscal
decentralization and economic growth.
(a) The nature of efficiency and its measurement:  What is well accepted in the theory
and practice of fiscal decentralization is that, given certain conditions, subnational governments
can be more efficient.  This can mean two things.  First, the same amount of funds spent at the
subnational level rather than at the national level can result in increased individual welfare.  This
can be true for some services since local and regional governments are better at discerning the
preferences and needs of their constituencies and can more easily adapt their expenditure
policies to fulfill them. This increase in welfare through decentralized expenditures can be
termed the greater "consumer or allocative efficiency” of decentralized expenditures.
Second, it is also possible, but by no means a foregone conclusion, that spending the
funds through subnational governments can lead to greater “producer efficiency.”  That is, the
same services or infrastructure can be put in place at a lower cost, or a particular budget can
yield larger quantities or better quality of services and infrastructure when the funds are spent at
the subnational level. 
In general, there would be little dispute with the contention that fiscal decentralization
can result in greater consumer efficiency.  The lack of disagreement is not because there have
30  The public finance literature has concentrated on testing how well local budgets may satisfy the demand for public
services from representative taxpayers based on statistical tests and surveys. There are no quantitative studies comparing
the relative (consumer) efficiency of decentralized versus centralized fiscal systems. 
31  Prud’homme (1995) argues that there are reasons, such as better paying jobs and career prospects, to believe that
central government bureaucracies are likely to operate closer to the technical production frontier, even though both
central and local bureaucracies probably operate quite far from this frontier. For dissenting views see Sewell (1996), who
argues that well-functioning subnational bureaucracies exist in many countries and Bardhan (1997) who notes that
putting decision-making authority in the hands of those who have information on local tastes and preferences provides
strong incentives for the more efficient provision of local public goods.
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been measurements of these effects.  In fact, tests of this nature have been few and far between.30
This is because of the a priori belief that a decentralized system can be more responsive to
differences in demands among taxpayers and to their basic needs. It can be argued that
differences in preferences are not likely to be that important in developing and transitional
economies (Prud’homme, 1995) but, in fact, subnational governments can be more efficient than
the central government even if all individuals have identical preferences or if they lack mobility.
Central governments may have a greater tendency to spend funds, for example, on national
defense when the priorities of taxpayers may be better reflected, for example, by greater
expenditures on education and sanitation.
The assertion that fiscal decentralization can result in greater producer efficiency would
be disputed by many.  What kind of evidence is there on differences in producer efficiency?  The
question put forward by Prud’homme (1995), Tanzi (1996), and others is whether or not local
governments operate on the same production frontier as the central government and whether or
not this question would receive the same answer in developed and developing and transitional
economies.31  On the other hand, Shah (1999) argues that the institutional environment in
developing countries necessitates a greater degree of decentralization because of the high
transaction and administrative costs implied by centralized systems.  In addition,
decentralization may lead to greater producer efficiency in that it fosters experimentation and
32  Gramlich (1987) and  Salmon (1987) are among those who argue that decentralization results in increased competition
among subnational governments and fosters innovation in the provision of public goods.  See Strumph (1999) for a
dissenting view to this line of reasoning.  
33  Somewhat ironically, the regressions of measures of fiscal decentralization on growth are viewed in the recent
empirical literature as a test of the “efficiency proposition” of fiscal decentralization. See, for example, Davoodi and Zou
(1998) and  Zhang and Zou (1997, 1998). The truth, however, is that the efficiency gains associated with decentralization
are not captured in measures of economic growth. The theoretical approach in this literature is also inadequate especially
if there is a desire to put emphasis on the efficiency gains associated with decentralization. Typically, this literature
assumes the presence of a simple representative agent with utility as a function of private consumption, and government
expenditures at all levels of government. Consequently, this type of theoretical framework omits by force the
consideration of consumer efficiency gains associated with decentralization which require the presence of several agents
with different preferences or tastes for public goods. There is no attempt in this literature either to try to capture any
differences in “producer efficiency”. A dollar of expenditure in these models produces the same level of public good at
all levels of government.
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innovation in the provision of goods and services.32  In practice, subnational governments in
many countries have been in the vanguard of privatization of public services (World Bank,
1999).  But on the whole, there is little empirical evidence one way or another about whether
local governments are more or less producer efficient than central governments. 
For the sake of argument, let us assume that at least in some cases decentralization leads
to greater consumer and producer efficiency.  It is very significant that neither of these two
potential effects of decentralization, greater consumer efficiency and greater producer efficiency,
are recorded in the national income accounts.  Greater consumer efficiency translates into greater
individual welfare but no independent measures of this exist.  Public expenditures with different
levels of consumer efficiency are identically recorded in the income accounts: by the level of
expenditures at the national or subnational level.  Similarly, equal expenditure programs with
very different levels of producer efficiency will provide the same reading in the national income
and product accounts.33  If the greater efficiency associated with fiscal decentralization is not
directly accounted for in the conventional measures of output and economic growth, how is it
that greater efficiency may affect measured growth?
 (b) What is the nature of the linkage between greater efficiency and measured economic
growth?  If fiscal decentralization leads to greater producer efficiency, then the indirect link
34  See Diamond (1990) for a discussion of the measurement and estimation of the efficiency of public services.
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between fiscal decentralization and growth is somewhat intuitive.   National accounts measure
public output by the level of expenditures, regardless of which level of government spends the
funds. But if decentralized governments can produce more output (or better quality output) than
the central government, with the same level of expenditures, then greater producer efficiency at
the subnational level is occurring.  Eventually the higher quantity or quality of the locally-
provided public services, the true output, would result in increased income and, therefore, in
measured growth.   
In the case of consumer efficiency, the relationship is less intuitive. Several complex
elements are at play.  On the positive side, by better matching the preferences of citizens and
increasing their individual welfare, there may be secondary effects on work effort, savings, and
private investment, all of which would have a positive impact on measured economic growth at a
later date.  It is also possible that if public resources are “more efficiently spent” at the
subnational level, this would mean, for example, that a better educated and healthier labor force
or faster, less costly, transportation will result in greater (measured) economic growth in the
future.
In this sense, tighter empirical tests of the impact of decentralization on economic growth
should focus on whether or not fiscal decentralization, other things being equal (such as
expenditure levels, per capita income, and so on), results in improved test scores or other
measures of education, or better health status indices.34  This means that we should test for the
presence of direct impacts of fiscal decentralization on the basic components of the growth
equation (better quantity and quality of inputs) rather than just directly on economic growth per
se.  However, the intermediate effect of decentralization on the quantity or quality of some
35  See, for example, Rondinelli and Nellis (1986).
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public services, such as roads built by subnational governments, is likely to be more difficult to
quantify.
On the negative side, it is conceivable that the mix of recurrent and capital expenditures
and the sectoral composition of these expenditures (into roads, education, parks, and so on) that
maximize the welfare of local residents may not be the mix that maximizes measured economic
growth over time.  The issue is whether or not there are other mixes of public expenditures that
will have a greater positive impact on measured economic growth and whether some of these
mixes may be more easily achieved through a centralized system of public finances. The
underlying premise of socialist planned economies and central management and planning in
many market economies in past decades was that centralized systems were superior in this
respect. The poor performance of centralized systems has put into question their alleged
superiority. 35  However, in general, there is no reason to expect that the allocation of resources
that maximizes voters’ welfare through a fiscally decentralized and a democratically
representative process is the one that maximizes growth of measured output.  In practical terms
this means that it would be empirically possible to find that decentralization and measured
economic growth are not positively correlated.
(c) Other indirect effects on growth through decentralization: The theory of design of
fiscal decentralization emphasizes a number of tradeoffs between efficiency and other objectives
such as balanced distribution of resources across regions or macroeconomic stability (Guess,
Loehr, and Martinez-Vazquez, 1997). The issue is whether or not changes in income distribution
36  See Shah (1999) for a review of the literature on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and macroeconomic
stability.  Little cross-country research has been undertaken on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and
horizontal fiscal imbalances across subnational governments.
37  Burki, Perry, and Dillinger (1999), using a panel data set of 32 countries, found that there is an almost 1-to-1
correspondence between increases in subnational deficits and central government expenditures and deficits in the
subsequent period.  They failed, however, to examine whether this translated into greater macroeconomic instability.
-20-
and in macroeconomic stability resulting from fiscal decentralization will also have an indirect
but measurable impact on economic growth.36 
Empirically, estimating the indirect impact of fiscal decentralization through horizontal
fiscal imbalances and macroeconomic stability will require two sets of estimations. First, is
fiscal decentralization actually associated with, or does it result in, a more unequal distribution
of resources across regions and a more unstable macroeconomic environment?  Second, what are
the quantitative tradeoffs between macroeconomic stability (assuming that it comes from
decentralization) and economic growth?  That is, how much does macroeconomic instability
retard economic growth? And, how much does the unequal distribution of income across regions
affect the rate of economic growth?  Let us take first the issue of macroeconomic stability. There
is considerable controversy in the fiscal decentralization literature as to whether or not fiscal
decentralization works against macroeconomic stability.  As pointed out above, Prud’homme
(1995) and Tanzi (1996) are among those that have issued warnings on these negative potential
effects of decentralization but McLure (1995), Sewell (1996), and Spahn (1997), among others,
have questioned the validity of this link. So far, there has been no empirical test of the link
between decentralization and macroeconomic stability.37  But even if there is no inexorable link
between fiscal decentralization and macroeconomic instability, there is wide consensus that
poorly designed systems (for example, allowing subnational governments to borrow without
controls with central governments covering any defaults) lead to instability.  In these cases,
fiscal decentralization could lead to less growth because there is some evidence that
38  See Bird and Rodriguez (1999) for the case of the Philippines.
39 We do not understand well either how growth may affect regional disparities.  Prud’homme (1995) cites a number of
studies showing that regional disparities do not disappear with economic development.  On the other hand, there is
evidence of a substantial narrowing of regional income differentials in the long run in the United States (See Barro and
Sala-i-Martin, 1992).
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macroeconomic instability retards growth (Fischer, 1993).  But curiously, what most researchers
point to as an example of decentralization gone awry, the crises in Argentina and Brazil during
the late 1980s and early 1990s, may not be attributable, at least entirely, to decentralization
policies.  Easterly (2000) finds that, in general, economic and fiscal policies improved during
this period for the countries in this region and that economic shocks, not poor policies, were to
blame for the debt crises and recessions of this period. 
Let us now take on the issue of the distribution of public resources across subnational
governments.  The first issue is whether or not decentralization causes a more unequal
distribution of public resources.  Again, there has been no empirical test of this proposition.
However, a priori, there may be some agreement with Prud’homme’s (1995) argument that, all
else being equal, unfettered fiscal decentralization is likely to lead to a concentration of
resources in a few geographical locations and thus increase fiscal disparities across subnational
governments. The accompanying presumption is that more centralized public sectors will
attempt to produce a geographically more balanced distribution by channeling resources from
richer areas to poorer ones.  Conversely, centralized systems could create inequitable
distributions of public resources by favoring politically important jurisdictions over jurisdictions
with greater needs but of less political importance.38  But again, neither of these two
propositions, that unfettered decentralization leads to the geographical concentration of resources
and that centralized public sectors yield more geographically balanced distributions, has been
empirically tested. There is also little evidence regarding how inequality across regions affects
long-term economic growth.39  This is another area that awaits testing.
40  See Persson and Tabellini (1994), Birdsall et al. (1996), Deininger and Squire (1996), Perotti (1996), and Forbes
(2000).  Barro (1999) offers a dissenting view by noting that the previous studies failed to condition the results for the
fertility rate, and once one does so, the coefficient on income inequality is statistically insignificant.
41 See Deininger and Squire (1996), Dollar and Kraay (2000), and Srinivasan (2000) for further discussion of the
measurement issues associated with income inequality.
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A different issue is how the distribution of resources among subnational jurisidictions
actually affects economic growth. Economists have given considerable attention to
understanding the links between income distribution and economic growth. However, this
research has concentrated on income inequality across the population and not with income
disparities across regions.  Whether or not lower levels of income inequality across the
population translate into increased economic growth is still a matter of debate, with more recent
studies suggesting that increased inequality retards economic growth.40  However, while the
findings of these studies suggest that policies to reduce inequality will positively influence
economic growth, caution must be used when interpreting these results.  Significant problems do
exist when attempting to compare income inequality across countries and across time.  First, two
different measures of inequality are typically used in the analysis: those measures based upon
income distribution and those measures based on the distribution of consumption.  For the class
of countries with income-based measures of inequality, differences exist between those countries
that measure inequality on the basis of gross income versus those that measure inequality on the
basis of net income.  Finally, while some countries use the household as the unit of
measurement, other countries measure inequality using the individual as the unit of
measurement.41
(d) Subnational government competition and economic development. A quite different
perspective on the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth is that fiscal
decentralization for better or worse can provide subnational officials with the ability to actively
42  In the United States early research found that this type of competition would appear to have little effect on business
location. However, more recent research (for example, Bartik 1985, and Wasylenko and McGuire, 1985) finds that there
is some effect.
43  While not specifically addressing the question of whether fiscal decentralization results in increased corruption,
Schleifer and Vishny (1993) argued that rent-seeking activities increase when the role of the central government in
society declines.
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pursue economic development policies. Often, subnational governments’ development policies
include several forms of competition among regional and local governments. These may include
granting tax privileges and offering other forms of assistance to businesses willing to locate in a
particular jurisdiction. This is an issue surrounded by considerable controversy in North America
and in Western Europe.42  Less research and discussion has been addressed to these issues in
developing and transitional countries, but it would appear that similar policies are at play there
as well. At stake is whether interjurisdictional competition can actually help promote economic
growth in a country or whether it is actually a zero-sum or even a negative-sum game among
local and regional governments for a fixed set of resources or economic activity.  On the positive
side, there is the possibility that interjurisdictional competition (of whatever form) forces
government officials to deliver services at minimum feasible cost, thus enhancing producer
efficiency at the subnational level. The lack of competition at the central government level may
mean that costs of public services are higher than they ought to be. On the negative side,
competition may lead subnational governments to underprovide public services and basic
infrastructure (Break, 1967; Strumph, 1999). This, of course, would retard growth.
(e) Corruption, capture, and fiscal decentralization: Does fiscal decentralization result in
increased corruption or the capture of local governments, and, if so, how does it affect economic
growth?  Some researchers have suggested that corruption is likely to increase when central
government authority declines or fails and that corruption is more prevalent in federal systems.43
Corruption is likely to be more prevalent at the local level because there is more opportunity and
44  Prud’homme (1995), Tanzi (1994, 1996), Rose-Ackerman (1997), and Carbarona (2000) have argued that
decentralization in developing and transitional economies increases the likelihood of rent-seeking activities by public
officials.
45  See Tanzi (1998) and Shah (2000) for reviews of the literature on the relationship between decentralization and
corruption.
46  Corruption, in fact, takes many forms, from the formal inclusion of exemptions in the tax structure that favor certain
segments of society to bribes to tax assessors, kickbacks or other side payments in the awarding of contracts or through
political patronage in the appointment of local employees. See World Bank (1997).
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pressure by local interests, and local officials may have more discretion and fewer obstacles
because of the often blurred distinction between politicians and bureaucrats.44  Treisman (1999,
2000) argues that federal states may be perceived to be more corrupt than unitary states due to
three factors: federal states are typically larger than unitary states, implying diminishing returns
to reducing corruption; the existence of separate police forces at multiple levels of government;
and a higher likelihood of having a bicameral legislature where the upper house is regionally
elected and possesses veto power.45  However, these results appear to be sensitive to the
inclusion of other variables and may also suffer from omitted variable bias (Gurgur and Shah,
2000).
In some developing countries there is a widespread belief that corruption is deeply
ingrained in local government institutions.46  Corrupt behavior on the part of local officials, of
course, reduces the potential benefits of fiscal decentralization.  Corrupt behavior would also
reduce private incomes (as citizens must pay bribes to receive public services for which they
have already paid taxes) and increase income inequality (as the tax structure is modified to favor
those who have sufficient resources to influence government officials).
But several counter arguments have been made to this proposition.  Decentralization may
reduce opportunities for corruption since local policymakers are more visible to their
constituents and thus corrupt behavior is more likely to be noticed than at the central level of
47  See Murphy, Libonatti, and Salinardi (1995), Sewell (1996), Guess, Loehr, and Martinez-Vazquez (1997), and Shah
(2000).
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government.47  Corruption is enhanced by the presence of monopoly powers and discretion, and
is diminished by the presence of accountability (Klitgaard, 1988). If decentralized governance
limits monopoly political power and makes government more accountable to the local
constituencies, then decentralization may help reduce corruption.  In addition, the potential for
the realization of economic rents may be larger in the case of central government policies such
as import quotas or tax privileges.  The damage inflicted by corruption at the central level can be
several orders of magnitude greater than what can be inflicted at the local level due to increased
access to resources and capital markets. Local officials have limited powers and budgets. Thus
the return to rent-seeking behavior at the local level of government may be small relative to the
center.
While the relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption has been the subject
of increased attention in the literature, there has only been limited empirical analysis of this
issue.  Huther and Shah (1998), in the first empirical study of this issue, found a negative
correlation between fiscal decentralization and corruption.  Fisman and Gatti (2000) also found
empirical evidence to support the argument of a negative relationship but Treisman (2000) finds
that corruption is more prevalent in federal states.  More recently, Shah (2000), using a cross-
section of developed and developing countries, found that decentralization negatively influences
corruption and enhances accountability in the public sector.  Decentralization, in this study,
appears to have a more significant, negative influence on corruption in unitary rather than in
federal countries.  Further empirical study will be required on the topic of decentralization and
corruption and how it may impact economic growth.
Another potential effect of fiscal decentralization, which may affect expenditure
efficiency and ultimately affect economic growth, is that local officials, even if they are
48  See, among  others, Conyers (1990), Oates (1993), Tanzi (1996), Bardhan and Mookherjee (1998), Martinez-Vazquez
and McNab (1998), and Alesina (1999).
49  See Bardhan and Mookherjee (1998, 1999) and Dethier (1999, 2000).
50  See Shleifer (1997) for an examination of the effects of capture on economic development in Russia relative to Poland
since the beginning of transition.
51  See, for example, Blair (1998), Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (1998), Burki, Perry, and Dillinger (1999), and Dethier
(1999, 2000).
-26-
popularly elected, may be subservient to the needs of the local elites.48   Local capture creates a
series of problems including overstatement of the cost of provision of local public goods,
corruption, and diversion of local public goods to non-intended groups.49  The local elite may
also wish to understate the demand for local public goods in order to lower revenue requirements
and taxes.  If the preferences of the local elites differ significantly from those of the majority of
voters, decentralization reduces local expenditure efficiency and eventually retards economic
growth.  This, of course, assumes that centralized systems can be more responsive to the tastes
and preferences of local voters.  However, if the central government is itself controlled by a
cadre of national elites, then it is possible, as population heterogeneity increases, that
decentralization might still deliver a more efficient allocation of resources, especially if local
preferences differ significantly from those at the center.  In addition, competition among regional
interest groups may lower the return to “capture by elites” at the subnational level relative to the
central level of government.50
In practice, democratic governance, including frequent and open elections, a free press
and mass media, and rule of law may serve to prevent local (and national) capture of public
resources by a minority elite.51  Case studies of democratic decentralization in developing and
transitional countries suggest that many new constituencies gain representation through public
office (Blair, 1998).  This suggests that the concern over local elite capturing the allocative
efficiency gains may be overstated.  In summary, it is not clear whether capture by local elites
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and divergence from local preferences will be more pronounced under decentralized or
centralized systems and therefore how fiscal decentralization may indirectly affect economic
growth.  These questions await empirical research.
5. Summary and Conclusions
The impact of fiscal decentralization on growth is more than an academic question.
Whether decentralization affects economic growth has become an important policy issue for
developing and transitional countries. This is an issue of importance both for large countries like
China and India and also for small countries like the Baltic Countries or those in Central
America.
In general, our knowledge of how decentralization affects economic growth is too limited
at the present time to allow us to proffer advice.  We have seen that the empirical evidence of the
correlation between the extent of decentralization and economic growth is mixed and that this
empirical evidence may not be entirely reliable because of several potential problems with the
methodological approaches followed to derive those tests. On a theoretical level we have also
seen that the overall impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth may be uncertain. In
terms of a direct impact, if Oates’ (1993) argument is correct, we should expect higher growth
associated with decentralization. But this dynamic superiority of decentralized over centralized
public expenditures is by no means obvious. We have also seen that there are potentially a
multiplicity of indirect effects of decentralization on growth including those through consumer
efficiency, producer efficiency, the geographical distribution of resources, macroeconomic
stability, corruption, and capture by elites.  Through these indirect effects there are forces at
work that will link decentralization to higher economic growth but there are others that work in
the opposite direction. At the present time, we are not even in a position to capitalize on what we
52  Capital investment also seems to be a decisive factor in helping the poor (Deininger and Squire, 1996).
53  To complicate things further, it is not entirely clear that greater public investment/expenditures (as opposed to public
consumption expenditures) lead to higher economic growth (Devarajan et al., 1996).
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know with more certainty is a significant determinant of economic growth:  capital spending.52
Currently, we have no knowledge about whether or not decentralized fiscal systems dedicate
fewer resources to public investment than centralized ones; nor do we know about differences in
the effectiveness or quality of public investment undertaken by different levels of government.53
In light of the lack of consistent knowledge on the impact of decentralization on growth,
it would seem safe to argue that policy advice and international aid must still focus on improving
the design of fiscal decentralization in developing and the transitional economies. Even if we
were to find at some later date that decentralization retards economic growth, this effect would
need to be weighed against the positive impact of decentralization on the efficient allocation of
economic resources and other possible benefits such as democratic governance and enhanced
accountability.  A contribution of this review, we hope, is to begin to outline a research agenda
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